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REPORTS OF CASES 
DETERMINED IN 
THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF CALiFORNIA 
fL. A. No. 18613. In Bank Oct. 6, 1943.1 
ROBERT LEES lVlcCORDIC, Respondent, v. ~AMUEL M. 
CRA WFORD et al., Defendants; ABBO'r-KINNEY 
COMPANY (a Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] New Trial-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination 
-When Period Commences.-When the prevailing party serves 
written notice of entry of judgment on the opposing party, 
the time within which a motion for new trial may be made 
and granted under Code Civ. Proc., § 660, begins to run. 
[2] Id.-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination-When 
Period Commences-Effect of Error as to Date of Judgment 
in Notice of Entry.-Inasmuch as Code Civ. Proc., § 660, does 
not require that the date of entry of judgment be mentioned 
in the notice, a notice of entry of judgment which erroneously 
states the date of entry is not invalid and' is sufficient to set 
in motion the 60-day period within which the court has, juris-
diction to grant a motion for new trial. 
[3] Id.-Procedure-Notice of Entry of Judgment.-No particular 
form of notice of entry of judgment is required by Code Civ. 
[1] See 20 Cal.Jur. 192. 
[2] See 20 Cal.Jur. 176. 
McK. Dig. References: [1,2,4] New Trial, § 216(2); [3] New 
Trial, § 142; [5] Theaters and Public Resorts, § 11; [6] Theaters 
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Proc., § 660. All that is essential is that the notice identify 
the judgment and advise the opposing party that it has been 
entered. 
ld.-Procedure-Statutory Period for Determination-When 
Period Commencea-:-p'ower of Appellate Court to Overrido 
Limitation.-Since the Legislature has fixed a 60-day period 
within which a court can pass on a motion for new trial, an 
appellate court is not authorized to fix any other number of 
days or to override the limitation because an otherwise. correct 
notice of entry of judgment fell short of a perfectIon not 
prescribed by the statute. (Disapproving of language to con-
trary in Lauritzen v. R L. Judell tf; Go., 109 Ca1.App. 168, 
292 P. 536.) 
Theaters and Public Resorts-Duties and Liabilities of Owner . 
-Personal lnjuriea-:-Care Requi.red.-A proprietor or opera-
tor of a place of amusement must see that the premises are in 
a reasonably safe condition, and is guilty of a breach of duty 
if he fails to exercise reasonably careful supervision, of the 
appliances or methods of oI,erating concessions. under h~s 
management. He is liable to an invited member of the pubhc 
for injury received as a result of negligence on the part· of an 
independent contractor or concessionaire when it is shown 
that failure to exercise supervision proximately resulted in the 
injuries sustained; and the fact that the proprietor did not 
advertise the amusemen~ area is immaterial, it being sufficient 
that he shared in the· proceeds of the amusement concessions. 
ld.-Duties and Liabilities of Owner-Evidence-Sufficiency.-
In an action for injuries received by a carnival patron when 
a strap on a concessionaire's amusement device broke, ~he e,:i-
dence supported a finding that the owner of the premIses dId 
not exercise a reasonably careful supervision of the concession 
where he failed to inspect the device, to test its safety or to 
question the concessionaire concerning its safety, the defect in 
the strap being one which could have been revealed by a test 
that the concessionl),ire made of other straps. 
ld.-Duties and Liabilities of Owner-Pleading.-In an action 
for injuries sustained by a carnival patron when a strap on a 
concessionaire's amusement device broke, allegations of a com-
plaint that defendant was the proprietor of the premises and 
negligently equipped, constructed and maintained the device 
thereon were sufficient to admit proof that he maintained the 
premises, received a certain percentage of the gross proceeds 
[5] Duty and liability of owner or keeper of place of amusement 
respecting injuries to patrons, notes, 22 A.L.R. 610; 29. A.L.R. 29; 
38 A.L.R. 357; 44 A.L.R. 203; 53 A.L.R. 855; 61 A.L.R. 1289; 98 
A.L.R. 557. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 560; 26 R.C.L. 713, 717. 
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of the concession in quel:itiun, and failed to inspect the device 
to test its safety. . 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los . 
Angeles County and from an order refusing judgment not~ 
withstanding the verdict. Ruben S. Schmidt, Judge. ·Af~ 
firmed. 
Action for damages for personal injuries received, when S. 
strap on an amusement device broke. judgment for plalntiff 
affirmed. . i , 
Parker & Stanbury, Harry D.Parker. Raymo~d:,G. Stan." 
bury and Vernon W. Hunt for Appeilant. "'I ,'" 
Borton, Petrini, Conron & Bortonand'Re~inaldi:!I3a~d~r',: 
for Respondent. . , 
TRAYNOR, J.-Venice Pier is le'ased'''frotnthe'~ityot 
Venice by defendant Abbot-Kinney. Company and'ism8.iri~· 
tainedand repaired by the latter. The carnival attractions 
on the pIer are operated by concessionafres under contract' 
with Abbot-Kinney Company. Defendant Samuel CraWford 
was authorized to operate a "Loopa" on the pier, Under an 
oral agreement that the company receiveM per' cent of the 
gross receipts. The Loopa was somewhat like an old-fashioned 
swing, with a board suspended by Rteel rods from an 'axle', 
some fifteen or twenty feet above the ground. It was so' 
constructed that riders standing on. the board could cause 
the swing to make a complete circle around ,the axle. ' The 
feet of the riders were strapped to the board andth'eir 
shoulders to the steel rods. A sign by' the_ device stated : : 
"They are safe. Riders are securely fastened in the Loopas/' . 
There was evidence that an expert rider wOuldpiace no 
strain on t~e straps, but that an inexperienced rider mi¥ht 
place a stram of up to 360 110unds on ",ach strap. The straps 
were made of leather folded over and stitched at various 
places. Those in use when plaintiff' was irijured had been, 
stitched shortly before that time by a shoe repairer. 'Craw. 
ford had tested some of the straps by fastening them to a' 
solid support and jumping on them, but he did 'not test tbQ 
straps placed on the swing where the accident occurred. 
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On August 10, 1940, the stitching in one of the ~ouldei' 
straps came apart while plaintiff, Rober~ McCordl.c, was 
riding the Loopa. He fell from the machme, an? ~lS head 
struck violently against the ground. He washospltahzed for 
more than three months. He commencE'd this action in May, 
1941 against defendants Crawford, Abbot-Kinney Company, 
Venice Mardi Gras Association, and Russell Lasher, who 
was in charge of the Loopa when the accident occurred. Dur-
ing the trial the action was abandoned as. to the Mardi Gras 
Association and a verdict was directed in favor of defendant 
Lasher. A 'verdict was returned ir. favor of plaintiff against 
the other defendants, and on January 14, 1942, judgment 
was cntered for plaintiff. On January 16th, a written notice 
of entry of judgment was served on iefendartts. It referred 
accurately to the book and page wherl. the judgment was 
entered but erroneously stated that the judgment had been 
entered on January 13, 1942. In due time a motion for a 
new trial was made, and on March 19, 1943, more than 60 
days after the service of the notice i)f entry of judgment, a 
new trial was granted. If the notice of entry of judgment 
was valid, the motion for new trial was automatically denied 
upon the expiration of the 60-day period. The court was 
thereafter without jurisdiction to enter a contrary order, 
and plaintiff had a right enforceable by mandamus to have 
execution issued upon the judgment (Kahn v. Smith, post, 
p. 12 [142 P.2d 13]; Payne v. Hunt, 214 Cal. 605 
[7 P.2d 302]; Kraft v. Lampton, 13 Cal.App.2d 596 [57 
P.2d 171]; Holq1dn v. Allison, 97 Cal.App. 126 [274 P. 
1037] .) To protect itself against this possibility, defendant 
Abbot-Kinney Company appeals from the judgment for 
plaintiff and from the order denying its motion for judg-
ment in its favor notwithstanding- the verdict. It is con-
tended that the notice of entry of judgn:.ent was invalid and 
did not start the 60-day period running because it contained 
an inaccurate date of entry of the judgmcnt. 
The necessity of setting limits to the time for granting a 
new trial is recognized in section 660 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure, which provides: "Except as otherwise provided 
in section 12a of this code, the power of the court to pass on 
motion for a new trial shall expire sixty (60) days from and 
after service on the moving party of written notice of the 
entry of the judgment, or if such notice has not theretofore 
Oct. 1943] MCCORDIC V. CRAWFORD 
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been. served, then sixty (60) days after filing of the notice 
of intention to move for a new trial. If such motion is. not' 
determined within said period of sixty (60) days, or within 
said period as thus extended, the effect shall be. a denial of 
the motion without further order of the court." 
[1] It is thus left to the prevailing party to take the ini-
tiative in .insuring the finality of the judgment by serving 
upon the opposing party written notice of entry of the judg- , 
ment. When he does so, the time within which a motion for 
new trial may be made (Labarthe v. McRae, 35. Cal.App.2d 
734 [97 P.2d 251]) and granted (Gross v. Hazeltine, 206 
Cal. 130 [273 P. 550]) begins to run. A notice of inten-
tion to move for new trial must be filed "within ten (10) 
days after receiving written notice of the entry of judgment." 
(Code Civ. Proc. section 659.) Until the date of service ihere 
is no restriction on the right to move fora new tdal. ThUS 
the date of service of notice of entry of the judgment marks 
the starting point in this regard as well as for the sixty-day 
period in which the court retains power to grant a motion 
for new trial. [2] Since the date of entry of the judgment 
itself is of no significance in either case, a notice of entry of 
judgment in which it appears that the jll,dgment was entered 
earlier than it actually was cannot serve to make the rights 
of the prevailing party subject indefinitely to litigation. Sec-
tion 660 does not require that the date of entry of the judg-
ment be even mentioned j it does not in fact prescribe any 
set form of notice. (See 20 Cal.Jur. 176; Waddingham v. 
Tubbs, 95 Cal. 249 [30 P. 527] ; Santa Ana etc. Ca. v~ Ernest 
Rurup Estate, 23 Cal.App.2d 445 [73 P;2d 908].) Th:us in 
Waddi'ligham v. Tubbs, supra, a notice of entry of judament 
. . 0 
was held sufficient even though it referred merely to the 
judgment heretofore entered. An error in the date is not 
significant when the date itself is not. [3] An error in an 
unessentialdetaiI cannot defeat the very purpose of the notice 
authc)):izedby section 660. What is essential is that the notice 
identify the judgment and advise the opposing party that it 
has been entered. The omission in the code itself of any 
particularization of the form of notice .is in striking contra-
diction to the insistence upon a meticulous correctness of' the 
unessential that would vitiate the provision for a sixty-day 
period in which the court can pass on a motion for"new trhil: 
[4] When the Legislature has fixed 'this period at sixty day$ 
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it is not for this court to fix it at sixty-on( or any other num-
ber of days or to override the limitation outright because an 
otherwise correct notice fell' short of a perfection not pre-
scribed by the section .. Lauritzen v. H. L. Judell &; Co., 109 
Cal.App. 168 [292 P. 536], which assumed that the law was 
otherwise, is disapproved. In Carpentier v. Thurston, 30 Cal. 
123, relied on in the Lauritzen case, the court was concerned 
with a statute requiring that notice of intention to move for 
a new trial be filed within ten days after receipt of notice 
that judgment had. been rendered. N'oticE> was given that the 
judgment and findings had been signed. The court held that 
these acts did not amount to the rendering of the judgment, 
and that notice of other acts did not start the time running 
in which to move fo'r new trial. There is nothing to indicate 
that because the notice was h~ld defective on this ground it 
would have been held defe(ltive had it merely contained an 
inaccurate date of entry of judgment. 
The unimportance of such an inaccuracy becomes apparent 
in the light of the Legislature's concern to limit the time 
within which the court has power to grant a new trial. Fol;'-
merly the requirement that. the motion for new triai be made 
within 10 days after receipt of notice of entry of judgmellt 
was not accompanied by any limitation on the time. in which 
the court could dispose of the motion. (Code. Civ. Proc. 
(1901) secs. 659, 660.) In 1915, however, lOection 659 was 
amended to provide that tlie time for making the motion could 
not be extended by order or stipulation. . Section' 660 was 
Amended to limit the time in which the motion could be 
granted to three months. (Stats. 1915, p. 201, 202.). in 1923 
this period was reduced to two months (Stats. 1923, p. 234) 
and in 1929 fixed at 60 days. (SUi.ts. 1929, p. 824.) 
[5] Defendant contends that there is no evidence. of 
negligence on its part and that if any negligence led to the 
accident it is attributable to Crawford, the concessionaire. 
'fhe law is well settled in, this state, however,"that a. pro-
prietor, or one who operates a place of amusement, owes a 
legal duty to exercise. due care to protect from injury in-
dividuals who come upon his premises by his express or 
Implied invitation. He must see that such premises are in a 
reasonably safe condition. It constitutes a breach of this 
duty for him to fail to exercise reasonably careful supervision 
of the appliances or methods of operating concessions under 
Oct. 1943] MCCORDlC V. CRAwFORD 
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his manag:ement. The proprietor or operator. of such a place 
of amusement is liable to an invited member of the public for 
injuries received as the result of negligence on the part of an 
independent contractor or concessionaire when it is shown 
that the failure to exercise such supervision proximately re. 
suIts in injuries to a patron. The duty of exercising care, and 
the responsibility for the negligence of independent conces-
sionaires, are extended by law to the owner, the occupier or 
those in possession of the premises on which the amusement 
is being operated." (Basye v. Craft's Golden State Shows, 
43 Cal.App.2d 782, 788 [111 P.2d 746]; accord:Szasz v. 
Joyland Co., 84 Cal.App. 259 [257 P. 871]; Johnstonev~ 
Panama Pac. I. E. Co., 187 Cal. 323 [202P.34];Harvey v. 
Machtig, 73 Cal.App. 667 [239 P. 78];, Whyte v/-Idb"o/Park, .' 
Co., 29 Cal.App. 342 [155 P. 1018]; Engstrom v. Huntley, 345. 
Pa. 10 [26 A.2d 461] ; Hollis v. Kansas Oity etc:, Ass1i:'205 
Mo. 508 [103 S.W. 32, 14 L.R.A;N.S. 284] ; StickeZv~ .RiVer-, 
view Sharpshooters Park Co., 250 m. 452'[95 N.:if i445, 34 
L.R.A.N.S. 659] ; W odnik v. Luna Park Amusement 00., 89 
Wash. 638 [125 P. 941, 42 L.RA.N.S. 1070] ; Restatement, 
Torts, sec. 344, p. 944; 22 A;L.R. 624; '29 A.L.R. 31, 736 ;44 
A.L.R. 204; 53 A.L.R. 855; 61 A.L.R. 1289; 98 A.L.R.; 557.) 
Defendant attempts to distinguish these cases' on' the 
ground that it did not advertise the amusement area. It is 
sufficient, however, that defendant, as the proprietor of Venice 
Pier, sharing in the proceeds of the amusement concesSions 
maintained the pier as a place of amusement open to th~ 
public. (Ibid.) . / 
[6] The evidence shows that defenda:nt did not exercise a 
reasonably careful supervision of the concesSion iIi question: 
It failed to make any inspection of the device'/to test its'safetY 
or even to question Crawford concerning, its safety. Thecoii~. 
tention cannot be sustained that an inspection of the defective: 
strap would not have revealed the defect~ for the jury' eouId 
reasonably conclude from the evidence that the defect would 
have been revealed by the very test that Crawford made of 
the other straps. The evidence shows that the defective strap 
was not strong enough to withstand a load of 160 pounds, a 
weakness that would have been revealed even 'by Crawford's 
simple test, which subjected the other straps to a much greater 
strain. The jury was clearly warranted in concluding that 
the defendant would have discovered the defect in the strap 
had it exercised reasonable care to inspect the Loopa and that 
.. 
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its failure to do so was the proxi~ate cause of plaintiff's in-
jury. . 
[7] Defendant contends that the pleadmgs do not ch.8::ge 
the defendant with failure to exercise rea.sonable supervISIOn 
of the device in question. The allegatIOns of the second 
amended complaint, however, that defendant was the pro-
prietor of the pier and ne~ligently. equipped, con~tructed, an? 
, . tained the device on ItS premIses were sufficIent to admIt 
mam h' . d 25 per proof that defendant maintained t e pI.er, ;ecelve . 
cent of the gross proceeds of the c?nCeSSIOn m questIon, an~ 
failed to inspect the device to test Its safety. More.over,. testI-
mony as to all these facts was given during the trIal WIthout 
objection. 
The judgment and order appealed from are affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Carter, J., and Schauer, J., concurred. 
EDMONDS, J., Dissenting-By the decision of a majo~ity 
of this court, the appellant is deprived of a remedy pec~lIa::­
ly within the province of the trial judge to grant, W.hIch It 
had sought with due diligence in proper form a~d. whIch t~e 
trial judge had decided should be given .. In arrlvmg at thIS 
conclusion, the majority opinion emphaSIzes bu.t ~ne. o~ the 
two dates which start the running of the 60-day JUrlsdlCtIonal 
period within which the trial court is empow~red to. gran~ a 
motion for a new trial. The filing of the notIce of mtentlOn 
to move therefor also starts the running of that period, and 
in the present case, as in Kahn v. Smith, post, p'. 1~ [142 
P.2d 13], the defendants filed such notice well wlthI~ ten 
days from the service of the defective notice o~ entry of Judg-
ment. (See Code Civ. Proc., sec. 659.) Certaml! ~here each 
of the litigants serves and files a notice which lImIts the au-
thority of the court to act, the court sh?ul.d hold .that, as be-
tween the two, one incorrect in form IS meffectlve and the 
other authorizes judicial action which would be proper except 
for the conflict between it and the defective notice. Further-
more, the decision of the majority fails to apply well-accepted 
rules governing the scope of collateral attack upon app~al­
able orders. (See discussion in my dissent in Kahn v. Sm~th, 
post, p. 12 [142 P.2d 13].) . 
'l'he limitations upon the power of the trIal court to pass 
upon a motion for a new trial must be considered in connec-
tion with the llurpose and policy of that procedure. Although 
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it is primarily designed to secure are-examination of the 
issues of fact, the motion also serves id bring to' thenoticedf 
the court errors which mayhaye been committed'in thecolirse' 
of the trial (see grounds fornew trial; Code eiv; Proc.;sec: 
657) and provides an opportunity for the correction of such 
errors without subjecting the parties, to the expense" an:d'iIil 
convenience of an appeal (Spier v.Lan(j~ 4 CaL2d 711, 714 
[53 P.2d138] ; and see cases cited in 39 Am.Jur.; New Triai,' 
sec; 17, pp. 42, 43). In establishing thisprocedlire, the Legis~ 
lature has recognized that the interests of justice may require 
an independent reweighing of the evidence by the trial 'judge 
after rendition of the verdict by the jury, arid this court has, 
upon occasions, criticized the reluctance of trial judges gen-
erally to exercise their power of granting a motion for a 'new 
trial for insufficiency of the evidence and their'inclination to 
acquiesce in a verdict which does not constitute the jv,st con-
clusion to be drawn from the evidence. (Greenv. Soule, 145 
'Cal. 96,102 [78P. 337].) In case after case it has been em-
phasized that the trial judge, unlike an appellate court, has 
had the same opportunity as the jury to observe the manner 
of the witnesses and to pass upon their credibility; as a con-
sequence he cannot rely upon a conflict in the evidence to 
uphold the verdict but must exercise his' duty to see that it 
is not clearly against the weight of the evidence. (Rosenberg 
v. Geo. A. Moore &- 00., 194 Cal. 392,396'[229 P.34] ; Greene 
v. Soule, supra, at pp. 102, 103; Bates v. Howard, 105 Cal. 173, 
178 [38P. 715] ; D1:ckey v. Davis, 39 Cal. 565, 569; Gardner 
v. Marshall, 56 Cal.App.2d 6'2, 66 [132P.2d 833] ; Lasch v; 
Edgar, 46 Cal.App.2d 726, 730 [116 P.2d 949] ; Owings v. 
Gatchell, 32 Cal.App.2d 482, 487, 488 [90 P.2d 268] ; and see 
Tweedale v. Barnett, 172 Cal. 271, 274, 275 [156 P. 483] ; 
Empire Investment 00. v. Mort, 169 Cal. 732, 736 [147 P. 
960] ; Gordon v. Roberts, 162 Cal. 506, 508; 509 [123 P. 288]; 
Keogh v. Maulding, 52 Cal.App.2d 17,19 [125 P.2d 858];) 
For he is ina position to determine between the apparent and 
the real, and to detect the fallacy of specious testinlOily which 
may have misled the jury, but which his wider experien:ceen-
abIes him to comprehend. (Bates v. Howard, supra, atp. 178.) 
The parties are entitled to the verdict of the jury in the first 
instance, but upon a motion for a new trial they are entitled, 
to the independent determination of the judge as .to whether 
Rlleh verdict is supported by the evidence. (Green v. SoUle, 
supr~> 
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Undoubtedly these broad purposes have led the appellate 
courts liberally to construe the limitations upon the exercise 
of this power. Thus this court has held that so long as the 
court "passes" upon the motion within the 60-day period, it 
has lawfully exercised its jurisdiction to determine the mo-
tion, and the signing and filing of the formal order or find-
ings subsequent to the last day of that period do not affect 
the validity of its act. (Spier v. Lang, supra, at p. 715; Holland 
v. Superior Court, 121 Cal.App. 523, 531 [9 P~2d 531).) And 
although section 661 of the Code of Civil Procedure states 
that the motion, if heard by a judge other than the one who 
presided at the trial, "shall be argued orally or shall be sub-
mitted without oral argument ... not later than ten (10) 
days before the expiration of the time within which the court 
has power to pass on the same," the court has construed the 
requirement as directory and not jurisdictional and upon 
that theory 'affirmed an order granting a motion for a new 
trial although the motion was submitted for decision but 
three days before the expiration of the 60-day period. (Pap-
padatos v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. 334 [287 P. 342].) 
Under section 660 of the Code of Civil Procedure either of 
two dates ,may start the running of the 60-day jurisdictional 
period within which the trial court has the power, to' pMS 
upon amotion for a new trial. The party in whose favor the 
judgment was rendered may fix the time by serving upon his 
adversary written notice of the entry of judgment. On the 
other hand, if such not.ice has not theretofore been served, the 
jurisdictional period commences upon the filing of the notice 
of intention to move for a 'new trial. The statute also , pro-
vides that if the motion is not determined within the specified 
time, "the effect shall be a denial of the motion without fur-
ther order of the court." 
But in the present action, as in Kahn v, Smith, pos~,p. 
12 [142 P.2d 13), and in Lituritzen v. H. L. JudeU & 
Co., 109 CaLApp. 168 [292 P. 536), the court granted the mo-
tion for a, new trial within' sixty days from the filing of, the 
notice of intention to move therefor, hence it was acting within 
its jurisdiction if the notice of entry of judgment ,was ineffec-
tive. Three facts are particularly relevant in considering the 
rights of the parties under these circumstances. In the first 
place, the delay in passing upon the motion for a n,e", trial is 
in no way attributable to the appellant, who acted promptly" 
filing its notice of intention on the seventh day following the 
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entry. of judgmen~. Secondly, the action of the trial judge in 
grantmg. the motIOn shows that he intended to determine it 
by ~ ruh~g and not to have it denied by the lapse of time 
speCIfied m the s~atute. And, ftnally,the respondent did not 
c~a~lenge the merIts of the ruling by an appeal from the order. 
Glvmg eff:ct to the purpose of the motion and the desirability 
?f pro~ot~ng the prompt .administra~ion of justice by allow-
mg trI.al Judges to ~et aSIde determInations not justi:ijed by, 
the we~ght of the eVl~ence and to correct ~rrors w'hichwould' 
otherWIse be the basIS of expensive and time-conSumm 'a -
peals, an~ departure from strict regularity in' the; rioti~e~f 
entry of Jud~ent sho~ld render it hieffective aSia .li~it~tion 
upon !he exerCIse ofthiS po~er, ContrarytQthe:respoi1dent's 
assertion, the cases of Lau'Ntzen, v~H~ L~Judell&;Oo, au ra 
and Weeks v. Cae, 36 Ap, p.Div 339 [55 NY S 2' 6ft ]'" p, t': d . d d "~ . , '''" were no 
t~CI e, upon the groun~ that the error in the notice misled 
. e opposmg party to hIS detriment,but upon the doctrine 
Just stated, ' " 
A pplying this. rule of construction, to the facts of the pres-: 
ent case, the notice of entry of judgment set forth a.n errone-
ous date of entry. As a consequence the notice dId notliinit' 
tb.e power of the court to pass upon the motiorl:for anew'} 
trIal and, ~ the court granted the motion,' within sixty,d~ s 
from the filIng of the appellant's notice o"f' I'n't' , 't'" , t: ' ',' y f " .' ,en Ion 0 move"' 
,or a ;new trIal, It was. actIng within the jurisd.i~ti()nai p~riod; 
And. It may not b~ saId that Abbot~Kinney Co:mpany by" Ii ::: 
pealmg f;om the Judgment has waived its right to questi~Ii 
t~~ s~ffiCIenCy ~f ~he n.otice, particularly since .it' has con-
SI~ en. y UJ;ged In Its brIefs that, the order granting, th~ new' , 
~nal. IS valId and that the appeal is taken onltO , ,'f ' "liT, 
Its rIghts, ' "y ,sa eguaru:" 
N?r is the appe~ant now precluded f~om~sserting that the' 
~er:nc~ o,f theno~Ice of entry of judgment did notftx the ; 
JurISd,I~tIOnal perIod for a ruling on a' m?tionfor,ne~,tr:ial 
by, fallIng to .appeal from th~ order deriying its,moti~n to 
strIke the 1l0tlC~ of entry of Judgment., For,aBsumiD.that ',,' 
such .an order I,S ,appealable, the denial; w~ not neoo!aril , ' 
a rulIng determmIng the effect of the not! .'" ,Th' "h - ,Yo 1 
h 'd' . h ' ' ,ce., e cOl1rt may ave agree WIt the argument of counselthat th a :!l':Jt ", ,', ' 
vented the service of' the notice from limitI'ng" teh ' e ec pref~' 
th rt ',' epo:wer 0 
e c?u t~ pas.supon the motion for neW' trial but in th ' 
exercls, e of Its dIscretion decided that the 'n:' oti' 'h .!., he h . ' " ce s owmg t e 
~rror ~ ould remaIn a ~art of the record upon which it acted 
III rulmg upon the motIOn for a new trial Also I'f th' " . , e error 
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rendered the notice ineffective no real object would be served 
by striking it from the files. Furthermore, the fact that the 
notice might be ineffective for one purpose would not neces-
sarily mean that it is ineffective for other purposes. 
In relying upon the cases of Waddinghamv. Tubbs, 95 Cal. 
249 [30 P. 527], and Santa Ana etc. Co. v. Ernest Rurup Es-
tate, 23 Cal.App.2d 445 [73 P.2d 908], the majority opinion 
fails to recognize the rule that a stronger showing is required 
to justify interference with an order granting a new trial than 
with one which has been denied. (See Abercrombie v. Thom-
sen, 59 Cal.App.2d 331, 337 [138 P.2d 701].) . Thus Wad~ 
dingham v. Tttbbs, supra, is clearly distinguishable from the. 
present action, for there the court not only denied the motion 
for a new trial but also held that there was no error in the 
facts stated in the notice of entry of judgment. And in Santa 
Ana etc. Co. v. E.rnest Rttrup Estate,supra, another case 
where the motion for new trial was denied, the notice of entry 
of judgment was in the customary form and correctly con-
tained all of the necessary data. 
For these reasons, I believe, as no appeal was taken from 
the order granting a new trial, the judgment was· vacated 
and the appeal should be dismissed. 
Shenk, J., and Curtis, J., concurred. 
[L. A. No. 18341. In Bank. Oct. 6, 1943.J 
FRED J. KAHN et al., Petitioners, v. B. J. SMITH, as 
County Clerk, etc., Respondent. 
[1] Mandamus-To Court Officers.-Mandamus is an appropriate 
remedy to compel the county clerk to issue a writ of execution 
where an order granting a new trial is invalid and execution 
has been denied, despite the availability of an appeal from 
that order. 
[2] Id.-Conditions Affecting. Issuance-Existence of Other Rem-
edy-Appeal as Inadequate.-While mandamus does not lie 
[lJ See 16 Ca1.Jur. 837; 35 Am.Jur. 22. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Mandamus, § 66; [2J Mandamus, 
§15(5)j [3J Time, §9; New Trial, §216(2); [4] Process, §86; 
[5] Costs, § 32. 
f 
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. ' 
if there is another adequate remedy, the writ is .~vailable a~ . 
an alternative remedy where an appeal would be inadequate;. " . 
in which case a failure to. appeal cannot render: the'trilif 
court's determination res judicata. . , .j' :,.;,,:~(;.'?~ .. '. 
, " : , ... '",~')' . ,;<Htf.:~.':t){t 
[3] Time-Fractions of a Day:-New" Trial-ProcedUr&-Statu:! 
tory Period for Determination"""':'When Period ComnienceiC' 
Fractions of a day are not consideredfD the compfttation br 
time if they do not affect the substantial rightso£<aparty~ 
They will be disregarded in ascertaining. whethe:r': notice ,of 
entry of judgment was made within the,time prescribed.bi' ' 
Code Civ. Proc., § 660, as the time limit, for niaking:a motion 
for new trial and the time limit for th~ court to pass on. such 
motion starts from the day and not from thEiliour 'of service: 
[4] Process-Notices and Papers-Giving Notic~By:M:ail..-Cod~ 
Civ. Proc., § 1013, allowing an additional day. after service by 
mail if, within a given number of days after such service,. an 
act is to be done by the adverse party, is not applicable in a 
mandamus proceeding to compel the county clerk to issue a. 
writ of execution after the court erroneously granted a new 
trial on the sixty-first day after notice of entry of judgment 
was served, for the court is not an adverse party to such pro-
ceeding. 
[5] Costs-Items Allowable-Attorney's Fees.-Attorney's fees are 
not ordinarily awarded to the successful party without express 
statutory authorization. 
PROCEEDING in mandamus to compel County Clerk of 
Orange County to issue a writ of execution. Writ of mandamus 
granted. 
Laurence B. Martin for Petitioners. 
J oelE. Ogle, County Counsel, and Forgy; Reinhaus & Forgy 
for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-On August 25, 1939, Fred J. Kahn and 
his wife, Alice J. Kahn, brought suit against the San Diego 
Orange Growers and Mr. Glann Feldner. On August 22, 1940, 
Mr. and Mrs. Kahn served notice on the defendants in that 
action that the judgment in their favor had been entered on 
the preceding day. They were in error, the judgment actu-
ally having been entered on the 22nd. Their error was the 
result of misinformation ina letter to them from the county 
[5] See 7 Cal.Jur. 286; 14 Am.Jur. 38. 
